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Power, Virtue, and Vice 
 
Peggy DesAutels 
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Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost 
always bad men. Lord Acton 
 
1. A Non-Idealized Approach to Virtue and Ethics 
  Most virtue theory is idealized and provides unrealistic and unattainable 
exemplars for living virtuous and flourishing lives. A non-idealized virtue theory, on the 
other hand, should provide useful guidance for living virtuously in our day-to-day 
choices, behaviors, practices, and projects. It should accommodate human cognitive and 
practical constraints and respond to the complexities of actual experienced lives over 
time. Among the practical constraints are the limitations connected with the social 
situations in which we are embedded. In other words, contemporary virtue theory should 
be psychologically and socially realistic while accommodating a developmental 
perspective. We become more virtuous as we mature only if we develop certain types of 
virtue-conducive psychologies and only under virtue-conducive conditions. 
  When we take a non-idealized approach to virtue theory, perhaps the most 
significant social reality is that persons’ psychologies develop and are embedded within 
hierarchical social structures. Some groups of people have power over other groups of 
people and control the resources needed to flourish. Some individuals amass great power 
and expect others to serve and obey them. More sinister is the social reality that some 
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individuals coercively control others; some psychologically abuse others; and some 
enslave others. Given the reality of the human condition, it is realistically impossible for 
all to be free of systematic social constraints and to live virtuous flourishing lives.   
  We can attempt as best we can to eliminate social structures that oppress and 
enslave persons and groups of persons. We can attempt to promote social structures that 
empower and encourage people. But what we cannot eliminate is the social fact that some 
people will have more social power than others, and given that fact, it is inevitable that 
some people will amass and abuse power. Hierarchical social and political institutions 
will remain. Wealth inequities will remain. Abusive husbands, abusive bosses, abusive 
dictators and so on, will remain. And unfortunately, patriarchal as well as racist and 
classist cultures and institutions will remain.  
      My aim in this paper is to approach virtue theory in a way that avoids idealized 
social ontologies and instead focuses on social hierarchies that include relations of power. 
(For more on non-idealized approaches to social theory see Charles Mills, 2004). I begin 
by focusing on a subset of virtues—what I refer to as social-ethic virtues. I then briefly 
discuss the ways that those attempting to develop social-ethic virtues are influenced by 
motivations for and situations involving power. I draw on research in social and 
personality psychology to show that persons motivated by power and persons holding 
powerful social positions tend to behave in ways that correlate with certain virtuous and 
vicious patters of behavior. Those motivated by and those in positions of power overlap, 
since those motivated by power are more likely to hold positions of power. I maintain 
that patterns of moral or vicious behavior (habits) tied to those in powerful positions are 
upheld by a combination of motivational dispositions and situational factors and that 
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although a strong and dominating sort of power can corrupt, an agentic power to affect 
social, political, and institutional change is necessary for the social-ethic virtues. 
2. Virtue and a Social Ethic  
      There are a number of possible goods that could contribute to a good life and a 
number of possible (even conflicting) virtues that could be combined in unique ways in a 
virtuous person. There are, as Owen Flanagan puts it, “varieties of moral personalities” 
(Flanagan 1991).  Nonetheless, some virtues are more morally significant than others, 
including the social virtues tied to creating and maintaining flourishing communities. As 
Aristotle points out,  
…for though admittedly the good is the same for a city as for an individual, still 
the good of the city is apparently a greater and more complete good to acquire and 
preserve. For while it is satisfactory to acquire and preserve the good even for an 
individual, it is finer and more divine to acquire and preserve it for a people and 
for cities (Aristotle, 1094b). 
For Aristotle, the highest good is political science—the study of justice, living well, and 
doing well. A more contemporary way to put this is that the development of virtues tied 
to addressing injustices and inequities in our social communities (nations, cities, 
organizations, workplaces) and attending to those who are suffering in those communities 
is important to living a virtuous life. This includes the development of social structures 
and communities that make it possible to manifest social-ethic virtues. 
      Jane Addams’ social approach to ethics is of relevance here. Jane Addams 
differentiates an individual ethic from a social ethic. On her view, someone who adheres 
to an individual ethic focuses on being kind, expressing compassion, and being attentive 
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to the suffering of local and specific individuals, but does not attend to the social systems 
and environments, including prejudices and systematic injustices, that produce and 
maintain this suffering. She contrasts an individual ethic with a social ethic that focuses 
on identifying and providing material and social conditions that best enable all to 
flourish. Addams writes, “To attain individual morality in an age demanding social 
morality, to pride one’s self on the results of personal effort when the time demands 
social adjustment, is utterly to fail to apprehend the situation”  (Addams, 2). Living by a 
social ethic requires, for Addams, that persons cultivate sympathetic understanding. They 
should not simply assume that they understand what others need in order to flourish. 
Rather they should immerse themselves in needy communities, listen empathetically to 
those who need assistance, determine what institutional and social adjustments need to be 
made to ameliorate the situation, and then coordinate with others to make these 
adjustments.  
      I focus here on the virtues tied to Addams’ social ethic and ask whether and to 
what degree holding positions of power aids or abets the development of social-ethic 
virtues. Note that social-ethic virtues are tied to long-term commitments and projects and 
include sympathetic interactions as well as an ability to understand and change complex 
systems and institutional structures. A number of social scientists have shown that many 
of our day-to-day behaviors, e.g. such “helping” behaviors as stopping to assist a stranger 
who has dropped some papers, are shaped by situational factors and not by supposed 
virtuous “kind-to-strangers” character traits. Nonetheless, most agents have life-guiding 
motivations and goals on which they act in the broader contexts of chosen situations in 
their lives. Some agents even have specific virtue-related life-guiding motivations and 
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goals that result in predicable types of chosen projects and types of moral or vicious 
behaviors. These could include the goals of more consistently identifying and responding 
to systematic structural injustices in political, institutional, and social settings—of 
cultivating and exercising virtues tied a social ethic. Or, conversely these could include 
the goal of amassing as much power over others as possible in order to dominate and 
control them—of arguably cultivating a vice of coercive control of others. In this paper, I 
examine (1) the motivational disposition tied to power, (2) the conditions under which 
those who are motivated by or in positions of power are likely to exhibit social-ethic 
vices, and (3) the conditions under which those who are motivated by or situated in 
positions of power are likely to exhibit social-ethic virtues. 
       Although my focus here is on a social ethic and virtues and vices of those with 
power, I have focused elsewhere on virtues and vices of those who are subjected to and 
attempt to resist power. When a person is oppressed, the virtues needed to resist are as 
Lisa Tessman describes them, “burdened virtues”. The oppressed are burdened because 
their flourishing is constrained by limits on freedom, material resources, political power, 
and social standing as well as by moral damage to their characters (Tessman 2005). I 
have argued elsewhere that there are special psychological and moral burdens for those, 
e.g. whistleblowers, who resist institutional power as well (DesAutels, 2009). If virtues of 
resisters are “burdened virtues”, perhaps it would be useful to think of virtues and vices 
of the powerful as “exalted virtues and vices,” since these vices are maintained and 
amplified by a powerful agent’s authority, material resources, and social status.   
3. Virtue and the Situation 
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      A number of social psychologists have shown ways that situational factors, often 
quite subtle, influence our day-to-day behaviors (see e.g. Milgram 1974; Ross and 
Nisbett 1991). As a result, some contemporary moral theorists have offered a situationist 
challenge to traditional forms of virtue ethics. They argue that we most likely do not have 
Aristotelian-style global character traits that reliably predict or explain moral behaviors 
across a wide range of situations (see e.g. Doris 2002; Harmon 1999). Situationist 
psychological research appears to show that situational factors play a more significant 
role in determining our moral behaviors and tendencies than do supposed stable character 
traits. Likewise, we would expect that situational factors play a more significant role in 
determining vicious behaviors and tendencies than do stable character traits. 
      There is no doubt that even those with the best of moral intentions are vulnerable 
at least to some degree to situational factors. One obvious correction for this vulnerability 
is to design and create situations, when possible, that elicit moral behaviors. I agree with 
Maria Merritt who writes, “An undertaking more sensible than the attempt to make your 
character as independent as possible of all particular social settings or relationships, 
would be the exercise of care in your choice of them, and so far as possible in how you 
allow yourself to be affected by them” (Merritt, 378). She points out that we have good 
reason to “take an active, discriminating interest in the climates of social expectation we 
inhabit” (Merritt, 381). I also agree with Mark Alfano who makes the stronger point that 
simply choosing our situations carefully is not enough. He writes, “…rather than simply 
seeking and avoiding situations based on their virtue-conducive properties, we may take a 
more active role and create (both for ourselves and for others) situations with an eye to 
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their virtue-conduciveness” (Alfano, 80).  Circumstances constrain what we can do, but 
they also offer possibilities; and the circumstances are at least partly of our own making. 
      Like Merritt and Alfano, I suggest that we critically examine environments and 
institutions to better understand their contributions to virtuous and vicious behaviors. 
Based on what we learn, we should then create better systems, policies, institutions, etc.. 
Although it may be true that it is psychologically impossible to have robust character 
traits that are expressed across a wide range of situations, it may nonetheless be possible 
to arrange our and others’ experiences in ways that result in persistently engaging in 
long-term moral projects, habitually behaving in moral ways, and consistently expressing 
patterns of behavior that coincide with virtuous behaviors. I maintain that if we wish to 
become more virtuous (that is live so as to advance moral goals and behave in ways 
consistent with a social ethic), we must embark on both moral self-improvement projects 
and moral situation-improvement projects. I also suggest that although we may not have 
full-blown character traits, we do, nonetheless, construct self-narratives and have broad 
patterns of motivation that tie in with certain virtuous and vicious patterns of behavior. 
4. Virtue and the Personal Narrative 
      Although we may not have virtues as traditionally understood, we construct 
narrative identities and life stories that when analyzed show social motivational themes. 
These themes are of relevance to and tie in with certain virtues and vices. Dan P. 
McAdams, a leading personality psychologist who conducts research on life stories 
writes: 
 …the stories we construct to make sense of our lives are fundamentally about our 
struggle to reconcile who we imagine we were, are, and might be in our heads and 
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bodies with who we were, are, and might be in the social contexts of family, 
community, the workplace, ethnicity, religion gender, social class and culture 
write large. The self comes to terms with society through narrative identity. 
(McAdams 2008, 242-43) 
Although it may not be psychologically possible to develop robust character traits, 
personal narratives show that some of us have self-described dispositions and tendencies 
to be motivated by some things and not others and to then consistently act on these 
motives. According to McAdams, “the kinds of behaviors and experiences which are set 
into motion—energized, directed, and selected—by a given motive are recurrently 
preferred by the individual who is dispositionally high on the motive. Thus, motives 
concern what people like to do—what they enjoy experiencing.” (McAdams 1988, 72)  
Power and intimacy are two distinct types of motivational forces or characteristic 
adaptations that McAdams has identified in subjects’ life stories. (McAdams, 2008, 1988)   
He maintains that individuals tend to differ by being motivated either more by power or 
more by intimacy. I say more about this below and how the dispositional motive for 
power, in particular, ties in with certain types of social-ethic virtues and vices.  
5. Power and Psychology 
      Power can be conceptualized and analyzed in a number of ways. One approach 
emphasizes power over others—the domination of and exercise of control over others. 
Another emphasizes power to act—the capacity or ability to accomplish something. 
Power over is a much more negative conception of power than is power to. The two are 
intimately connected: if one person has power over others, the others correspondingly 
lack the power to make choices that matter. I will be discussing both versions. It is also 
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important to differentiate individual power from systems of power. (For more 
perspectives on power, see Overbeck 2010 and Allen 2014.)  It is certainly possible for 
an individual to exercise personal power over someone else (e.g. a domestic abuser), but I 
emphasize here institutional systems of power and the hierarchical roles within these 
institutions that result in some people having power over subordinates through rewards or 
punishments as well as the power to act in both beneficial and harmful ways towards 
those with less power and status. 
      There are a variety of approaches to researching psychology and power. Some 
psychologists examine changes in behavior when subjects are in situations involving 
power and others look at motivations and dispositions to obtain power. At one extreme, 
situationist psychologists study the psychological effects of situations involving strong 
power--complete control over others--and of being embedded in such rigidly 
hierarchically organized institutions as prisons or military complexes. At the other 
extreme, situationists study slight and often implicit psychological effects tied to 
situations in which there are differential group-based social statuses. Philip Zimbardo, a 
social psychologist, focuses on situations involving strong power over others.  He is well-
known for setting up a simulated prison situation in which experimental subjects were 
randomly assigned to play the roles of powerful guards or compliant prisoners  (the 
Stanford Prison Experiments). Other social psychologists have measured the degree to 
which those in power positions or with high social status express empathy when 
compared to their less powerful or lower status counterparts. Personality psychologists 
have looked more at individuals’ power-related characteristic preferences and 
motivational structures. Some, including Dan McAdams, analyze themes in personal 
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narratives and life stories to identify those who are dispositionally more motivated by 
power than by intimacy. The situationist and personality power-related findings in 
psychology overlap, since those who are motivated by power tend to seek out positions of 
power. 
5.1 Social Psychology and Power 
 The Stanford Prison Experiment is now a classic example of how a situation 
involving extreme power differentials can drastically alter how otherwise ordinary people 
behave. Those who role-played being guards and prisoners in this simulated prison 
experiment were dramatically transformed by their roles. Although not all of the guards 
were transformed to the same degree, all became desensitized to the suffering of the 
“prisoners” and failed to challenge the system of abuse. In less than a week, some of the 
“guards” became surprisingly and quite creatively abusive. Zimbardo summarizes how 
the “guards” were changed as follows: 
Some of our volunteers who were randomly assigned to be guards soon came to 
abuse their newfound power by behaving sadistically—demeaning, degrading, 
and hurting the “prisoners” day in and night out….Other guards played their role 
in tough, demanding ways that were not particularly abusive, but they showed 
little sympathy for the plight of the suffering inmates. A few guards who could be 
classified as “good guards,” resisted the temptation of power and were at times 
considerate of the prisoners’ condition, doing little things like giving one an 
apple, another a cigarette, and so on. ….none of them [those assigned to be 
guards] ever intervened to prevent the “bad guards” from abusing the prisoners; 
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none complained to the staff, left their shift early or came to work late, or refused 
to work overtime in emergencies (Zimbardo, 207-208). 
This experimental simulated prison was a microcosm of a system of power in which there 
are extreme hierarchical roles, strong norms and pressures to conform, and forces of 
dehumanization that all contributed to a loss of empathy for and an unwillingness to help 
those who are suffering.  In other words, all of the “guards” developed social-ethic vices 
at least to some degree and some became extremely vicious while in their roles as guards.  
Fortunately, once the experiment was halted, these power-related vicious behaviors 
disappeared. 
Although the Stanford Prison Experiment was just that, an experiment, accounts 
given by and behaviors of those who served as prison guards at Abu Ghraib, engaged in 
genocide in Rwanda, or participated in the Holocaust echo the accounts and behaviors of 
those role-playing guards in a simulated prison. Zimbardo has studied many of these 
accounts and shares the following summary of interviews with Hutu militia members. 
….the French journalist Jean Hatzfeld interviewed ten of the Hutu militia 
members now in prison for having macheted to death thousands of Tutsi civilians. 
The testimonies of these ordinary men—mostly farmers, active church-goers, and 
a former teacher—are chilling in their matter-of-fact, remorseless depiction of 
unimaginable cruelty. Their words force us to confront the unthinkable again and 
again: that human beings are capable of totally abandoning their humanity for a 
mindless ideology, to follow and then exceed the orders of charismatic authorities 
to destroy everyone they label as ‘The Enemy’” (Zimbardo, 15). 
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In order to develop social-ethic virtues, it is important, I think, to familiarize ourselves 
with the kinds of situations that lead to the extreme opposing social-ethic vices of mass 
torture and genocide. True, most of us don’t live and work in prisons (and most of us are 
not active participants in genocidal behavior!), but the situations and systems of power 
created by many of our institutions and organizations have much more in common with 
prisons and genocides than we would like to believe. Zimbardo rightly maintains that the 
“military-corporate-religious complex is the ultimate megasystem controlling much of 
the resources and quality of life of many Americans today” (Zimbardo, 10). These 
megasystems are controlled by the powerful elite who often appeal to ideology and fear 
to enlist subordinates to maintain and expand the systems that disadvantage themselves 
and others. 
 It’s all done with words and images….The process begins with creating 
stereotyped conceptions of the other, dehumanized perceptions of the other, the 
other as worthless, the other as all-powerful, the other as demonic, the other as an 
abstract monster, the other as a fundamental threat to our cherished values and 
beliefs. With public fear notched up and the enemy threat imminent, reasonable 
people act irrationally, independent people act in mindless conformity, and 
peaceful people act as warriors (Zimbardo, 11). 
One of the take-away messages from Zimbardo’s work is that if any one of us were to be 
placed in an extreme situation like those found in prisons or genocides, we would be just 
as susceptible as the next person to the power of the situation. Another take-away 
message is that we are as susceptible to vice as the next person when participating in any 
system or culture that dehumanizes or stereotypes groups of people. This is the kernel of 
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truth underlying what Hanna Arendt called the “banality of evil.” It is our moral 
responsibility to be on guard against this susceptibility and to attempt to make all 
situations more conducive to humane and dignified treatment of others. 
      The Stanford Prison Experiment was conducted in 1971. Since then a number of 
psychologists have added to our understanding of the social psychology of power. For a 
compilation of noteworthy recent research on the topic, see Guinote and Vescio (2010). 
Some recent findings include that an increase in power or social status is correlated with 
a decrease in empathy and concern for the well-being of others (Fiske, 1993; Fiske &, 
Dépret 1996; Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske & Yzerbyt, 2000; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 
2003, Galisky et. al., 2008, 2006; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Russell & 
Fiske, 2010; Hogeveen, Inzlict, & Obhi, 2014). Findings also include that those in 
powerful positions tend to be less sensitive to individuating information about their 
subordinates. (Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000); that 
those in power tend to believe they know what is best for others (Cikara and Fiske, 105); 
that increases in power are correlated with increasingly negative evaluations of others 
accompanied by increasingly positive evaluations of self; (Georgeson & Harris, 1998, 
2000); that those in power talk loudly and interrupt more (Hall, Coates & LeBeau 2005); 
and that those in power tend to emphasize instrumentality by objectifying others in order 
to use them for personal gain (Keltner, Gruenfeld, Galinsky & Kraus 2010).   All of these 
power-related tendencies are tied to social-ethic vices. 
      An especially interesting study shows that even those who are simply primed to 
recall a situation in which they had power show a decrease in interpersonal sensitivity 
[motor resonance in the brain] from the priming effect. The researchers found “a linear 
 14 
relationship between power and the motor resonance system, whereby increasing levels 
of power are associated with decreasing amounts of resonance” (Hogeveen, Inzlict, & 
Obhi, 759).  It doesn’t take much at all for us to become less sensitive to the needs of 
others. 
5.2 Personality Psychology and Power Motivation 
 A significant direction in personality psychology is the empirical study and 
thematic analysis of personal narratives or life stories. This approach is grounded on the 
view that identities are constructed through narratives and that these stories help to direct, 
make sense of, and integrate people’s lives. As I mentioned above, Dan P. McAdams is 
personality psychologist who elicits and analyzes subject’s life stories in order to 
identify, for example, growth goals, motivational patterns, and characteristic adaptations. 
Jack J. Bauer is another (see e.g. McAdams 1988, 2008, Bauer and McAdams 2010, 
Bauer 2011). 
      McAdams recently published a concise summary of some of the more significant 
findings in personality psychology that use the personal narrative approach (McAdams 
2008). Of special interest to me are narrative themes tied to power and intimacy. 
McAdams writes, “Studies have shown that social motives concerning power and 
intimacy (viewed as characteristic adaptations) are systematically related to recurrent 
narrative themes in life stories. People with strong power motives tend to construct 
personal narratives and life stories that feature agentic life themes as self-mastery, status 
and victory, achievement and responsibility, and empowerment; those high in intimacy 
motivation tend to construct more communal life narratives, emphasizing love and 
friendship, dialogue, caring for others, and belongingness.” (McAdams 2008, 249) Power 
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motivation refers here to a recurrent preference for both amassing and controlling 
resources and increasing social status and control. It often includes a desire for conquest 
and domination (power over) along with a more benign desire for agentic effectiveness 
and mastery (power to). McAdams builds on David Winters’ work on the power motive: 
“The essence of power is the ability to make the material world and the social world 
conform to one’s own image or plan for it. This is a complicated process involving steps 
such as forming a plan, articulating it, rallying support and amassing resources, 
convincing others, checking the implementation, using positive and negative sanctions, 
and so forth…..the power motive should predict office seeking and office holding” 
(Winter & Stewart, 1978, 400 as quoted in McAdams 1988, 85). 
      The contrast offered by McAdams to the power motive is the intimacy motive. 
“The intimacy motive is defined as a recurrent preference or readiness for experiences of 
warm, close, and communicative exchange—interactions with others deemed ends rather 
than means to other ends.” (McAdams 1988, 77)  These communicative exchanges can 
be with family, friends, children, or others. Although some of these interactions are 
between those of unequal power and status (e.g. parent-child), studies have shown that 
those who score high in intimacy motivation are judged by their friends and 
acquaintances to be significantly less dominant than those who score low in intimacy 
motivation (McAdams, 190; McAdams & Powers, 1981) (McAdams 1988, 83).  
 So apparently, some people are primarily motivated by power and are more 
concerned with achieving control over their social and material worlds than they are with 
maintaining close, caring relationships.  These people risk having correlated vices of 
using others as a mere means to their own ends, dominating and exploiting others, and so 
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on. Not all people motivated by power are evil, however.  Some may simply be motivated 
to have the power needed to affect positive change and some may be able to avoid the 
vicious extremes.  Even so, sometimes the only way to act using one’s power is to think 
abstractly about a social system and to factor out the individualities of those who are 
suffering within that system—to reduce one’s sympathetic response and listening stance 
in order to move forward. 
 It is an uncontroversial fact that men are more likely than women to have 
systemic power (political, corporate, and so on). However, many social and personality 
psychologists ignore or downplay power and gender. For example, all of the participants 
in the Stanford Prison Experiment were male, but this is not emphasized much by 
Zimbardo. A few psychologists have looked for and found some power and gender-
related differences. For example, there is some evidence that ties aggressive and 
impulsive behavior to high power motivation in men but not in women (Stewart and 
Chester, 1982) Although men are stereotypically viewed as motivated by power and 
control and women are stereotypically viewed as motivated by intimacy, there are no 
consistent findings to date that these stereotypes hold up. There have been some studies 
that show sex differences in those who are power motivated. For example, one study 
concluded that among those who are well-educated and high in power motivation, men 
were more likely than women to marry partners who chose not to pursue professional 
careers. They speculate that this is so men who are motivated by power can better 
influence and control their wives (Winter, Stewart, and McClelland 1977). 
      In addition, our power-related beliefs and systems reflect the social 
understandings and master narratives of our cultures. Two social psychologists who study 
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effects of gender, Mina Cikara and Susan T. Fiske, note, “The pervasive beliefs about 
men and women legitimizes a system in which men have relatively more control than 
women in public domains (e.g. professional settings), whereas women are thought to 
have relatively more control than men in private domains (e.g. the home)” (Cikara and 
Fiske, 102). Carolyn G. Heilbrun has similarly noted that in Western Societies, many 
women “have been deprived of the narratives, or the texts, plots, or examples, by which 
they might assume power over—take control over—their lives” (Heilbrun 1988, 17 as 
quoted in McAdams 2008, 247). 
6. Power, Virtue, and Vice  
 It should be clear that the more power that people exercise over others, the more 
likely they are to exhibit vicious behaviors. At its worst, strong power contributes to and 
perpetuates torturous cruelty and deprivation and results in the opposing extreme to 
social-ethic behaviors. Some of the specific vicious social behaviors correlated with 
absolute power over others include:  Coercive control, exploitation, harassment, 
debasement, and a complete disregard for, or taking pleasure in, the suffering of others. 
      Most power is not absolute, but societies and institutions tend to organize 
themselves in hierarchies and to distribute power and status unevenly.  Culturally-situated 
vices are upheld by social and material advantages along with strong beliefs of 
entitlement.  For example, a sexual harasser often has a strong belief of entitlement to sex 
from those over whom he has power. Pervasive cultural attitudes and narratives that 
include group-based inequalities and dependence asymmetries will result in dominant 
group members exhibiting vicious traits (e.g. sexism, racism, etc.).  John Stuart Mill 
makes note of the harms to men’s character in patriarchal societies when he writes,  
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All the selfish propensities, the self-worship, the unjust self-preference, which 
exist among mankind, have their source and root in, and derive their principal 
nourishment from, the present constitution of the relation between men and 
women. Think what it is to a boy, to grow up to manhood in the belief that 
without any merit or any exertion of his own, though he may be the most 
frivolous and empty or the most ignorant and stolid of mankind, by the mere fact 
of being born a male he is by right the superior of all and every one of an entire 
half of the human race….What must be the effect on his character, of this lesson 
(Mill 1869, par. 33)? 
Alongside the vices associated with group-based power differentials, there are the vices 
associated with those who take on powerful roles in institutions. The powerful become 
more socially vicious through a failure to attend to or empathize with the needs of 
subordinates and through thinking they know what is best for others. The more powerful 
they get, the more likely they are to fail to focus on others as individuals and instead to 
use others instrumentally. They are also well-placed powerful insiders in that institution.  
If the institution itself is unjust or others in powerful positions are abusing power within 
that institution, it is usually impossible to address the injustices or to challenge others 
with power (e.g. to whistleblow) without being retaliated against and losing the power 
one once had.  Senator Elizabeth Warren makes this point in reference to a conversation 
she had with Larry Summers when he served as the director of the National Economic 
Council.  She writes that after a dinner, 
Larry leaned back in his chair and offered me some advice.  I had a choice.  I 
could be an insider or I could be an outsider.  Outsiders can say whatever they 
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want. But people on the inside don’t listen to them. Insiders, however, get lots of 
access and a chance to push their ideas. People—powerful people—listen to what 
they have to say. But insiders also understand one unbreakable rule: They don’t 
criticize other insiders (Warren as quoted by Morgenson 2014). 
Even when someone is as committed as Senator Warren to effect widespread positive 
social change, in order to have and maintain the power to do so, that person has to 
become an insider unwilling and unable to criticize harmful entrenched systems, 
practices, and individuals.  Thus insider power is paradoxical—you have power to effect 
positive change, but you most likely do not have that power if you hope to keep your 
power.  
 Is it possible, and if so what would it take, to remain socially virtuous after 
gaining and exercising the power needed to effect widespread positive social and 
institutional change?  No doubt, there are varieties of intelligence, personality traits, 
motivational dispositions, and expertises effective at gaining, maintaining, and exercising 
power virtuously. And there are a number of strategies one can take to avoid losing 
sympathy for others and becoming corrupt as effects of power. Those motivated to make 
a positive difference in the world should first think very carefully about their chosen 
situations and choose those that are most conducive to the development of social-ethic 
virtues.  These “situations” include educational trajectories, careers, roles, affiliations, 
employment, and moral projects.   
      If virtuous agents find themselves in situations that they cannot escape and that 
perpetuate injustices (or fails to be conducive to socially virtuous behavior), it is, of 
course, important to resist these situational pressures as much as is possible.  Zimbardo 
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offers some possible steps to take in order to resist unwanted situational influences that 
include: avoiding mindless inattention and practicing mindfulness about one’s situation; 
maintaining a sense of one’s own responsibilities; asserting one’s own and other’s 
uniqueness and individuality; distinguishing just from unjust authority over oneself; 
remaining vigilant over how a situation is described or framed; avoiding an exclusive 
focus on the present—focusing on past commitments and future goals; and opposing 
unjust systems. (Zimbardo 451-456).  I agree that mindfulness is important (see 
DesAutels 2004).  I also agree that resisting unjust systems is important, but doing so can 
be daunting at best and may result it more harm than good both to the resister and to 
those harmed by injustice. (DesAutels 2009).  
 Although resisting injustice is important (and someone has to do it!), it is also 
important to directly respond to and create institutions or organizations that meet the 
needs of others.  Jane Addams’s (1860-1935) virtues and accomplishments are exemplary 
of a life devoted to a social ethic.  She familiarized herself with the day-to-day struggles 
and needs of the poor immigrants in Chicago and responded by establishing Hull House.  
The social services provided by Hull House included child-care, meals, bathing facilities, 
job training, arts, and social events (Addams 1961). She emphasized the unique 
individualities and rich cultural backgrounds of the poor immigrants she served. In other 
words, she created an institutional social democracy--the antithesis of an abusive power 
system.  She was also instrumental in changing conditions for exploited and 
impoverished workers through a variety social, political, and economic reforms. And she 
was a life-long pacifist who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931. 
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 Most of us will not come close to matching Jane Addams’s virtues and 
accomplishments. However, there are many of us who, in our own ways, devote our lives 
to the public good. After collecting many, many life stories, McAdams identifies and 
describes from some of these stories what he terms the ‘generative adult’. He writes 
about generativity as follows:  “Procreation, child care, certain acts of altruism, and 
commitments to moral codes and societal continuity, as well as a wide range of strivings 
and behaviors aimed ultimately at promoting the social good from one generation to the 
next, especially as displayed by mature, socially integrated adults, can be seen as 
expressions of generativity” (McAdams 2013, 31). The social ethic virtues I emphasize 
here overlap with the tendencies found in McAdams’s ‘generative adult’ and closely 
match those promoted by Addams. They may include family-focused virtues but on 
Addams’s and my view must also include virtues devoted to justice and the relieving of 
suffering in our wider communities.  On my and Addams’s view, and unlike McAdams’s 
view of the generative adult, adherence to strict moral codes should avoided. The risk is 
that moral codes often rigidly assume what “the good” is for others and what types of acts 
are moral and immoral. Instead, the pragmatic emphasis is on learning more about the 
optimal conditions for human flourishing and how best to bring those about in the light of 
actual historical, institutional, and cultural conditions. 
What motivates persons to devote their lives to the social good and to develop the 
social-ethic virtues? McAdams points out that often those who devote much of their time 
and energy to the public good are motivated to do so early in their lives. Perhaps they 
were raised on religious convictions or in families that highly valued social justice. Or 
perhaps they had a formative childhood memory of being exposed to human suffering 
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and being moved to respond. Not everyone with like backgrounds and experiences 
develops social ethics virtues—some personalities are more responsive than others to the 
plights of others. And some people are better able to identify and respond to complex 
social issues. In addition, some people may be compassionate in one-on-one situations or 
in response to a particular image of a suffering person, but many people are unable to 
translate this empathetic response into feeling compassion for and responding to the 
suffering of large numbers.  Paul Slovic describes what he terms ‘psychic numbing.’  
Most of us cannot fully comprehend large-scale tragedies or form emotional connections 
to large numbers of sufferers (e.g. millions being murdered in a genocide) and instead 
become numbed and unresponsive (Slovic 2007). 
 Nonetheless, some of us do spend our lives responding as best we can to large-
scale suffering. What psychologies do such individuals have? According to McAdams, a 
theme that shows up in the life stories of generative adults is a conflict between a strong 
need for power and a strong need for love. As he puts it, “They want to exert a strong 
positive impact on the world and they want to be accepted by others in warm and caring 
relationships” (McAdams 2013, 47). Unfortunately, it is very difficult and often 
impossible for both of these needs to be met simultaneously, so many generative adults 
are conflicted. Regardless, some do manage to have and meet both needs if not 
synchronously throughout their adult lives, at least diachronically (e.g. focus on family 
for a few years then focus on social issues after that). Notice that here power is 
emphasized as “power to” and not “power over.”  
So, is Lord Acton right to say, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men”?  He may well be right that 
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absolute power corrupts absolutely.  But I argue that some types of power in some types 
of people facilitate social-ethic virtues.  And some great women and men are virtuous.  It 
is, indeed, both psychologically possible and morally desirable to need and obtain power 
to affect positive social change.   
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